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STASIS
BEYOND POLITICAL THEOLOGY?
Dimitris Vardoulakis
POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND THE UNWORKING OF MEANING
Political theology refers to the impossibility of both to completely sep-
arate and to completely conXate politics and religion. As Kenneth Rein-
hard describes political theology, “the political order is sustained by
theological concepts that it cannot completely assimilate.”1 It remains
a point of contention, however, what the repercussions of the tres-
passing of theological concepts into the political are. For Carl Schmitt,
this indicated the centrality of the sovereign power to decide.2 It led
Walter Benjamin to diagnose religion as a symptom of capitalism.3
Claude Lefort emphasized that the Enlightenment both rejected the
possibility of such a trespassing and could not do without it.4 Jan Ass-
mann has shown how political theology can lead to fruitful historical
investigations.5 Ernesto Laclau’s “empty signiWer” articulated the dis-
junctions and conjunctions of the political and the theological, insist-
ing that the “recognition of the constitutive nature of this gap and its
political institutionalization is the starting point of modern democ-
racy.”6 Despite the differences between these thinkers, there is one
abiding characteristic. There is a constitutive disjunction between pol-
itics and the political, between law and justice.7 As a result, political
theology forecloses meaning in politics—that is, no political party or
representative can be thought to represent the political ideal. More
emphatically, there is no end of history.
I will explore here whether it is possible to understand the fore-
closure of meaning not as the conclusion, but rather as the condition
of the possibility of the political. Can the meaningless or the irrational
function as the basis of the intertwining and imbrication of the secular
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and the sacred? I hasten to note the oxymoron of seeking to establish
a basis for a non-teleological politics. Is not the proclamation of a state
beyond already a tacit re-introduction of a teleology? A metaphysical
politics of foundations and essences is perfectly capable of establish-
ing itself upon a basis that dissimulates its own presence. A simple
negation of teleology can be nothing but teleological. What is needed
instead, as I will argue at the end, is the operative presence of an inter-
ruption that marks both the relation between the theological and the
political, as well as the possibility of judgment.
How can one bypass a complete negation of meaning or of the
rational? How can one avoid a negative (political) theology?8 I will
demonstrate here that “stasis” has the capacity to function as the
starting point of the relation between the theological and the political
because it neither negates the terms by positing them as exclusionary
nor conXates them. Far from simply negating a metaphysical basis for
the political, the historical roots of the word “stasis” go deep into both
politics and religion. I will explore those roots in detail shortly, merely
indicating here that stasis is linked to politics, since its primary mean-
ing is political change, revolution, or civil war, as well as to the theo-
logical, since it denotes immobility or immutability, both of which
were attributes of God. Stasis, then, presents the simultaneous pres-
ence and absence that exempliWes the unassimilable relation of the
sacred and the secular in political theology.
Nicole Loraux elaborates on this simultaneous presence and ab-
sence in the most important work on stasis, The Divided City.9 Loraux
starts with the amnesty granted in 403 BC to mark the end of the sta-
sis or civil war that ravaged the city of Athens. The amnesty was not
merely a protection from prosecution, but also a proscription against
remembering the events of the civil war. Stasis was an injunction to
forget. Simultaneously, however, this injunction was based precisely
on that which it proscribed, namely the past. That which is repressed
and unutterable organizes memory. Thus the proscription does not
have the merely negative function of prohibiting certain functions or
memories. It also plays the role of creating an imaginary past of a
utopian democracy, an idealized politeia, whose unretrievability is the
present’s condemnation to a lack of redemption.
Loraux further asserts that “we need to invent a language that is
not Roman in order to speak of stasis.”10 Stasis, according to Loraux,
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exempliWes the uniqueness of the Greek polis, that is, the political prior
to the advent of Christianity and the invention of a metaphysics of
presence. The uniqueness of the Greek paradigm has to be acknowl-
edged. But Loraux shies away from the challenge to bring the political
import of the Greek polis—and of stasis—to bear upon contemporary
notions of the political. Stasis has the ability to destabilize the relation
between religion and politics precisely because it introduces a pre-
metaphysical heritage. In addition, as a multivalent word, stasis has
the capacity to disturb the mutual support of presence and absence.
Thus, it has the capacity to unwork meaning. Because of this unwork-
ing, which is beyond the opposition of presence and absence, stasis
has the potential to allow for the differential relation between the polit-
ical and the theological.
Through a philological analysis in the next section, I will show
how such an unworking of meaning necessitates a politics of reading.
Stasis is a single word that incorporates the impossibility to either
conXate or separate the political from the theological. But this impos-
sibility needs to be gleaned from the way language operates. Stasis
gives rise to the responsibility to interpret its co-implication of pres-
ence and absence. It necessitates the work of interpretation in order
to unwork meaning. As I will argue at the end of this article, this notion
of the work is crucial in understanding political theology.
THE PHILOLOGICAL APPROACH
Stasis is derived from the verb istamai or istemi in ancient Greek. The
verb can mean either to stand up, or to be standing, to be waiting. It
can be either the movement upward or the state in which one Wnds
oneself after the movement is completed. The verb can denote either
an active or a middle voice. This ambiguity of the verbal form is car-
ried over to the nounal form of stasis.
Stasis branches out into two clusters of meaning derived from the
literal and Wgurative image of movement or lack thereof. In the Wrst
cluster, stasis refers to lack of movement, in the second, excessive move-
ment. Both these clusters extend into present-day linguistic use in such
a way as to attest to a notion of political theology.
The combination of movement and immobility rendered within the
word stasis recalls the late classical deWnition of the divine. According
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to Aristotle, the god, or theos, is the kinoun akinetos, the “unmoved
mover”—literally, that which moves while remaining static or un-
changing.11 Because such a god is understood as unchanging or as not
subject to external inXuence, it belongs to the Wrst cluster of meaning.
The verbal form was translated into the Latin stare, which privileges
the sense of a lack of movement; it denotes a rest, a standstill. For this
reason, modern usage of derivatives of stasis is aligned to the Wrst
cluster of meaning. Stare is the root of expressions such as “statute,”
“status quo,” or “static.” More signiWcantly, it is the root of the word
for body politic, “state,” and not only in English, but also in most mod-
ern European languages.12 A notion of a political theology is already
discernible in the linguistic deployment of stasis as immobility to des-
ignate Wrst the divine and then the body politic.
Judging by the use of the word “stasis” and its cognates in Solon
and Plato, and in Aristotle and Thucydides, the second cluster of sig-
niWcation was the predominant one in ancient Greece. Stasis as move-
ment means either civil war or revolution. Plato contrasts in Republic
470b stasis to polemos (war). While polemos is conducted against people
of a different race, those summarily designated as the barbarians, stasis
is an emfylios polemos, a war between people of the same race, namely
the Greeks. This distinction conceives of the body politic strictly in
terms of racial connection, like an extended family, which is Plato’s
argument. Stasis in Aristotle becomes synonymous with a series of
terms, μεταλ, νεωτερισμς, κνησις, and so forth, that characterize
not merely a racial upheaval, but rather a polis whose laws and insti-
tutions are unsettled. Book V of Politics describes stasis as revolu-
tion, even though it is a moot point whether stasis denotes primarily a
class struggle. The meaning of stasis as “movement” of the body politic
can be discerned today in the word “sedition.” In his translation of
Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, Hobbes consistently
rendered stasis as sedition. Sedition is that activity that undermines
the legal and political authority of the sovereign who, according to
Carl Schmitt, is analogous to God. In this second cluster, again, is pre-
sent the idea of a political theology.
Stasis, then, indicates two contradictory clusters of signiWcation
that start from ancient Greece and inform linguistic usage up to the
present. Because these contradictory clusters share a notion of political
theology, it is possible to start conceiving of a point where they will
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converge or even merge. In order for this merging to be conceptualized,
however, both those meanings that denote immobility and initially
refer to the theological, and those that denote movement and initially
refer to the political need the other, their opposite, in order to start to congeal
into the construct commonly called political theology. The term “political
theology” designates here the presupposition of the separability of its
constitutive elements. The political and the theological must be able
to negate each other before they can form an analogical relation. The
philosophical implications of this will be examined later with reference
to Carl Schmitt. The philological analysis, however, has more to offer.
There is a third category of meanings in which stasis and its deriv-
atives denote simultaneously and equally mobility and immobility,
thereby undermining their opposition or mutual negation. This both
distinguishes the third category of meanings from the two previous
clusters of meaning and forces a reconsideration of the neat separa-
bility of the political and the theological. The earliest example is a poem
by Alcaeus, the seventh-century Mytilenian poet:
I fail to understand the direction [stasis] of the winds: one wave rolls in
from this side, another from that, and we in the middle are carried along
in company with our great black ship, much distressed in the great
storm.13
The stasis of the winds denotes not only their direction but also the
place where their contradictory directions clash and cancel each other
out, creating a restless repose. The relation between restless repose,
on the one hand, and mobility and immobility, on the other, can be
understood in two different ways. Either restless repose is a dissem-
blance of mobility and immobility and in this sense is a metaleptic
presentation of their merge in political theology, or restless repose
can decisively disrupt the foundational separation between mobility
and immobility and hence undermine the very idea of a political the-
ology. In other words, the space where the counter-directional winds
cancel each other out can be viewed either as a dialectical overcom-
ing, a station toward the anticipated result that legitimates it in ad-
vance, or as the sidestepping of any dialectical progression, a reversal
of the dialectic or a “dialectic at a standstill” that eschews all attempts
at legitimacy. To choose between the two alternatives, closer attention
needs to be paid to the third category of meaning.
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This third category exhibits two main linguistic usages that at Wrst
glance seem unrelated to each other. First, stasis in argumentation is
the presentation of the contradictory positions within the course of a
philosophical argument. It belongs to the rhetorical tradition of anti-
logoi, or dissoi logoi. This received a technical deWnition in forensic rhet-
oric. As Hermogenes explains, stasis was that part of the argumentation
at the beginning of court proceedings that, having settled on the cor-
rectness of certain facts, disputed under which laws they were to be
ruled.14 The standard example is the murder of the adulterous eunuch.
A husband comes back home early and Wnds his wife in bed with a
eunuch. In a rage, he kills the eunuch. These facts are beyond dispute.
The issue or stasis is whether the deed should be classiWed under the
right of the husband to kill an adulterer or whether it should be clas-
siWed as a murder, given that the eunuch could not, properly speak-
ing, be an adulterer. The stasis here is between a lawful killing and an
unlawful murder.15 Or, viewed more broadly, stasis is the procedure
whereby an act is placed within a particular jurisdiction so that the
application of a law can be carried out. What is at stake, then, is the
lawfulness of hermeneutics, no less, perhaps, than a hermeneutics of
the lawful.
Second, stasis also means infection or disease. This meaning is
very old. It can be found in Solon’s Eunomia, the poem about rectify-
ing the political situation in Athens after the factional strife that threat-
ened its existence. In this context, stasis as disease might be taken as a
simple metonymy—faction is a “disease” that destroys or negates the
city—and hence assimilated to the second cluster of meaning. This is
the assumption of every researcher on stasis, from Loraux and Gehrke,
to Manolopoulos and Kalimtzis.16 This does not explain, however,
how Plato could use stasis in Timaeus in order to describe precisely
diseases of the body. In Timaeus (81e–82a), the meaning of stasis as
faction is used as the Wgurative presentation of the disease in the body,
thereby reversing the metonymical relation between disease and fac-
tion: here, disease is primary. In addition, the medical meaning of sta-
sis is still used today in expressions such as the “stasis of the blood”
(a symptom infection) or the “status of a disease” (the height or acme
of the disease). Therefore, disease cannot be treated as a simple meton-
ymy of faction and hence assimilated to it. Rather, stasis as infec-
tion is that which disturbs the equilibrium of a body, be it physical or
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political. This is the reason that that which is understood as diseased
has to be expunged. Conversely, the desire to expunge is the symp-
tom of understanding that which is opposed as diseased. In other
words, disease occupies in rhetoric an equivalent position to that of
negation in the logic of the political.
It is a small step, and at the same time a great leap, to talk about
this body also as a body of work, a corpus of writing. Body, then, can
be conceived as any organized system of discourse and stasis as that
force that disturbs or even destroys the system, the impulse toward
asystematicity. Making this leap also necessitates that the two mean-
ings in the third category of signiWcation of stasis, argument and dis-
ease, are taken as working together, and in such a way as to unsettle
the relation between the two main clusters of meaning. Indeed, the
hypothesis of this project on stasis is that there is a close connection
between interpretation and disease and, moreover, that this connec-
tion designates a different relating, one that disrupts the separation
between politics and theology presupposed by political theology. A
lawful hermeneutics becomes imbued with disease. No systematic meaning,
no organic whole is to be achieved.
Simultaneously, disease, also, becomes imbued with rhetoric; it be-
comes part of an expressive strategy. The designation of something as
unclean, impure, or inauthentic, as diseased, identiWes the political
motives of the enunciator and is part of his symptomatology. Stasis
either as immobility or as mobility incorporates a notion of disease
that is used to designate an opponent, an adversary to be suppressed.
The disease must be expunged; it is the cure through expunction that
indicates the presence of disease. Conversely, to adhere to the restless
repose of stasis means to resist separation, to resist a politics of adver-
sity, and to advance instead a politics of friendship.
The relation between stasis and friendship is central in Aristotle,
as will be shown later. One Wnal point needs to be made about the
third category of meaning. It demonstrates that a philological analysis
of lexical Gegensinn necessarily trespasses into other Welds of inquiry.
The idea that the Gegensinn of words can become a medium that
links polysemy and human action found an inXuential articulation in
Freud’s review of Karl Abel’s Über den Gegensinn der Urworte. Abel, a
philologist, had noticed how in Egyptian language, but also language
in general, “in the ‘oldest roots’ . . . antithetical double meanings are
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found to occur.”17 Such words elude a simple notion of negation, which
is precisely one of the characteristic ways a repressed content is artic-
ulated either in analysis or in dreams. Thus Freud concludes that psy-
choanalysts “should be better at understanding and translating the
language of dreams” with the assistance of a philological understand-
ing of the Gegensinn of words.18
Freud’s paper prompted two signiWcant responses. The Wrst is to
be found in William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity. According to
Empson, the seventh and “most ambiguous” type “occurs when the
two meanings of the word . . . are the two opposite meanings.” Such
a contradiction, Empson observes, “may be meaningless but it can
never be blank” and thus it is used in high literature with the effect
that the reader is “drawn taut between the two similar impulses into
the stasis of appreciation.”19 The “stasis of appreciation” recalls Al-
caeus’ boat at a standstill from the stasis of the winds. Empson is
highlighting here an experience of restless repose as the acme of the
reading experience. The validity of Freud’s reliance on philology is
put to the test by Benveniste in “Remarks on the Function of Language
in Freudian Theory.” Benveniste’s main objection is about Freud’s
assumption of a strict symmetry between language and dreams. “Far
from language reproducing the appearance of a dream, it is the dream
which is brought to the categories of language.”20 Benveniste indicates,
however, that Freud argued for the asymmetry between language and
the unconscious in the later paper “On Negation,” which rectiWes the
earlier mistake.21 SigniWcantly, the main addition in Freud’s paper
“On Negation” is a theory of judgment. Here semantic values are not
reduced to an individual’s repressed content, but rather extended to
the social sphere. Indeed, Freud explains the very possibility of par-
ticipating in the social—the power of judgment—through the impos-
sibility of absolute negation or denial of a certain content.
At this point, the polysemy of words such as stasis does not merely
extend from the linguistic and philological spheres to include inter-
pretation and understanding in a variety of cultural Welds, but is also
intertwined with the effective presence of the political. There is a pol-
itics of reading. This conclusion designates the limit of the philological
approach to stasis. A further elaboration of stasis will have to inter-
rogate the understanding of the political. What has the philological
analysis disclosed about the nature of the political? How is the political
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related to stasis’s differential meaning? These questions require a closer
look at political theology. The next section will show how stasis func-
tions in Carl Schmitt.
STASIS IN CARL SCHMITT: THE POWER OF THE SOVEREIGN
The cornerstone of Carl Schmitt’s political theology is the analogy
between God and the sovereign. The political and the theological are
Wrst separated through the difference between the sovereign and God
and then made analogous through the similarity between their respec-
tive actions. Although stasis does not Wgure often in Schmitt’s writ-
ings, it appears at strategic junctures. Schmitt uses stasis to structure
the crucial analogy between God and the sovereign. The possibility of
de-structuring Schmitt’s analogy will indicate an alternative Wgura-
tion of political theology, one that is not premised on a separation of
religion and politics, but rather one that embraces the working and
unworking, the systematizing and a-systematizing, the structuring
and de-structuring potential of stasis.
Schmitt’s political theology rests on a strong emphasis on the sov-
ereign. Schmitt deWned the sovereign in Political Theology as the one
“who decides on the exception.”22 The concept of the exception de-
notes an active intervention on the part of the sovereign. The sover-
eign’s decision is an act. Moreover, it is the deWning act of the sovereign.
So long as the possibility of a decision is pending, the identiWcation
of the sovereign is also pending. The nature of this active decision is
further elaborated in The Concept of the Political. Schmitt states that
“the speciWc political distinction to which political actions and motives
can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”23 The enemy plays
a more important role than the friend in the sovereign’s active deci-
sion.24 For this reason, Schmitt speciWes the exact nature of the enemy:
“The enemy is solely the public enemy . . . πλμις, not θρς.”25
With reference to Plato’s famous discussion of stasis in Republic 470,
Schmitt notes that only an external enemy is a real enemy; “[c]ivil
war (στσις) . . . is only a self-laceration” destroying the political. The
action of a sovereign strictly excludes the identiWcation of an internal
enemy. Following a long tradition of political theory going back to
Solon, Schmitt identiWes stasis as a “self-laceration” of the political,
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as a self-inXicted disease that should be expunged from the state. Dis-
ease is treated merely as a metonymy of stasis. A decision to engage
in stasis is indicative not of a lack of action, but rather of the wrong
action, the wrong decision, that confounds the state, sovereignty, and
the political. Stasis as civil war is “the dissolution of the state as an
organized political entity, internally peaceful, territorially enclosed,
and impenetrable to aliens.”26
Schmitt’s argument about the active engagement of the sovereign
is ampliWed by the argument in Political Theology that “all signiWcant
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological
concepts. . . . A continuous thread runs through the metaphysical,
political and sociological conceptions that postulate the sovereign as
a personal unit and primeval creator.”27 Thus there is an analogy be-
tween the god and sovereign upon which the claim of a political the-
ology rests.28 Schmitt shows in Politische Theologie II that stasis also
Wgures in the theological and in such a way as to elucidate the anal-
ogy between the sovereign and the god. The theological, however,
requires stasis for its determination. Schmitt cites from Gregory of
Nazianzus’ theological treatise De Filio, where the Trinity is described
in terms of stasis: “στι γρ κα τ ν στασιν πρς αυτ.” Schmitt
translates: “The One is always in revolt against itself.”29 The possibil-
ity of stasis safeguards the unity of the divine and consequently all
theological concepts consequent upon it. Stasis describes the divine
in active terms as the self-referential stasis of the Trinity. For the polit-
ical, stasis is a disease because the sovereign’s decision must be directed
to an enemy outside the body politic. Conversely, the theological sta-
sis guarantees the activity of the Trinity and hence its connection to
sovereignty, while also asserting that disease is never a metonymy of
the divine; the stasis of the Trinity is a description of the activity of
the divine that is omnipresent. Just like the sovereign, the Trinity is
also active. But this activity or self-revolt cannot be directed against
something outside the divine. Schmitt cites approvingly the motto
from Goethe’s fourth book of Dichtung und Wahrheit: “nemo contra
deum nisi deus ipse.”30 Only the divine can be an enemy to itself.
From this perspective, stasis becomes a pivotal term in Schmitt’s
political theology. Schmitt’s position is that the political and the the-
ological must be separated in order to become analogous.31 Politische 
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Theologie II is primarily concerned to show that all attempts to de-
politicize the theological or to detheologize the political fail because
they separate the theological and the political without grasping their
analogical connection. According to Schmitt, such attempts have in
common the presupposition of an existential dualism. This dualism
is manifest in religion through the distinction between a god as cre-
ator and as redeemer, while in politics through the distinction between
the holder of power and the reformer.32 These two elements are always
antagonistic. This undermines the unity of both the divine and the
sovereign. “So long as every unity,” observes Schmitt, “is a duality, it
has within itself the possibility of a revolt, a stasis, and then theology
appears to turn to ‘stasiology.’”33 Although both the divine and the
sovereign are active principles, the stasis in each case is different be-
cause their unities are different. The theological concept of unity re-
quires the internal unrest denoted by stasis to demonstrate that there
is nothing outside god. Conversely, the sovereign’s decision is by deW-
nition never self-legitimated, it is never guaranteed by statute or
norm. “Looked at normatively,” Schmitt writes, “the decision eman-
ates from nothingness.”34 All attempts at separating the theological
from the political—all depoliticizations and detheologizations—for-
get that stasis is a positive articulation only of divine unity. Their pos-
tulate becomes “nemo contra hominem nisi homo ipse.”35 Only the
human can be an enemy to itself. Unity is transferred to the human.
This universal humanity, however, requires a permanent state of revolt,
a perpetual stasis, for its self-deWnition. Such a humanized stasis is
nothing but a Xawed attempt to decide upon the enemy. The decision
between friend and enemy Xutters when all are uniWed under the ban-
ner of a universal humanity. Political romanticism, as Schmitt terms
this humanism, cancels out discord, lapsing instead in an endless and
inconsequential conversation. In political romanticism, activity cedes
to a pervading passivity.
Stasis allows Schmitt to develop a typology of action. This is a
crucial aspect of his political theology, given that action Wrst leads to
the separation and then to the analogy between the god and the sov-
ereign. Stasis denotes the all-inclusivity or completeness of divine
activity. But, when applied to human affairs, stasis propels a political
movement infected by self-destruction. Only the sovereign’s decision 
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is a proper human action precisely because it excludes the infectious 
stasis or civil war. In addition, it is through his theory of action that
Schmitt identiWes and rejects the bête noire of his political theology,
namely the political romanticism that, in all its manifestations, remains
solipsistic and hence passive—nothing but play, a mere game.
The predominance of action indicates an insistence on imma-
nence. Not only is the political understood as a decision immanent to
the situation the sovereign Wnds himself in, but also the divine as stasi-
azon is described in terms of the immanent struggle of its constitutive
elements. Through the overarching operation of immanence, action
becomes the binding term for the two different unities, the sovereign
and the divine. The difWculty with this approach, however, is to sus-
tain the analogy between the god and sovereign while retaining im-
manence. The sovereign’s immanence has to be enclosed within the
borders of the political, just as the stasis of the divine is an activity
only of the Trinity. This means that the sovereign’s decision—that is,
his designation of an enemy—can only be made against another sov-
ereign. To paraphrase Schmitt, nemo contra majesta nisi majestas ipse.
Only sovereignty can be an enemy to sovereignty. Then the political
becomes nothing but a chess game between sovereigns whose deci-
sions—that is, the moves they make—are not effected by the pawns,
the real people or peoples their moves effect. But if that is the case,
then the reputed immanence of Schmitt’s actative understanding of
the political evaporates. Either the chess game is nothing but a game,
which is precisely Schmitt’s accusation against political romanticism,
or the sovereign game re-inscribes transcendence. Transcendence can
only be re-inscribed, precisely, in and through the decision to exclude
stasis, to expunge the disease. For whose is that decision? It cannot 
be the sovereign’s, since the sovereign only decides upon the “real”
enemy, the polemio. Therefore, it is a decision beyond the decision, a
decision beyond the analogy of sovereign and the god. It is through this
“beyond” that immanent action is transWgured into transcendence.36
And yet, at the same time, it is also this “beyond” that marks and is
marked by stasis without which the analogy itself would no longer be
operative. Stasis, then, de-structures, deconstructs, Schmitt’s political
theology, showing that the very element of transcendence that it seeks
to exclude is that which founds its purported immanence.
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STASIS, JUSTICE, AND FRIENDSHIP: ON THE LIMIT
The separation of the political and the theological collapses so long as
the analogy between sovereign and the god unravels. This undercuts
the strong notion of sovereignty Schmitt sought to defend. Nothing
seems more obvious today in a globalized world. The increasing power
of international corporations suggests a reduction in the power of the
state. Globalization curtails sovereignty. And yet this is not to suggest
a simple overcoming of political theology. Globalization’s justiWcation
and legitimacy is accomplished through theological categories. The
appeal to a universalized individual whose right it is to act freely—
indeed, as freed from the hold of the state—is a re-inscription of the
religious sphere of the private at the very core of the most emphati-
cally, or presumptuously, secular. In today’s post-secular world, the
diminished power of the sovereign shows that political theology’s
forces of power and mastery seem more than ever before omnipresent
and omnipotent.
This raises the question about the limits of political theology, the
reach of its power to negate. A depoliticized theology may be just as
impossible as a detheologized politics; yet universalizing this struc-
ture assumes the erasure of limits in the essential relation between
theology and the political. There is no beyond political theology that
does not reproduce a structure without limits, that is, the essential
structure of political theology itself. Conversely, to speak of a “beyond”
political theology, where the “beyond” is not involved in a structure
of transcendence, is to assert the necessity of limits. To distinguish
this approach, it will be called here the theologico-political. The em-
phasis placed on the limit here indicates the nexus between ontology,
politics, and religion. Spinoza emphasized such a nexus in the Tracta-
tus Theologico-Politicus (1670). Organized religion and sovereignty are
expedient means whereby sociality or the being-with of humans is
organized. There is no being outside this being-with. Such an onto-
logical assertion makes even more pressing the need to locate the lim-
its, if any exist, organizing the theologico-political. In Jean-Luc Nancy’s
words, “What is at stake above all in being-with is the relation to the
limit.”37
From the perspective of a being-with that requires limits, the dis-
tinction between states or nations is mere expediency and hence a
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notion of war is a symptom of the unfolding of power. The question 
about the limit of power, about how to delimit power and hence to
make judgments about it, attempts to organize power in such a way
as to be neither purely immanent nor reliant on transcendence. In
other words, power no longer presupposes the separation of the polit-
ical and the theological. This is a power of power, that is, a power that
is always singular while also allowing for singularity and repetition.
Spinoza referred to such a power as the state of nature. As a result, the
political becomes aligned with potentiality. In Deleuze’s formulation,
Spinozan ontology is concerned with what a body can do.38 Poten-
tiality sets limits to power while insisting on the singularity of the
body, a body that is never alone but always a being-with. Viewing the
question of the limit in this manner entails that war between sover-
eign entities is an after-effect of contestation. Primary is the contesta-
tion that takes place as potentiality unfolds and also as a condition of
that potentiality itself. Contestation is inscribed within potentiality.
There is a generalized civil war. Such a civil war, such a stasis, be-
comes the ontological condition of the possibility of the political.
What is the name of this condition and how is it related to stasis?
A provisional answer has already being given by Loraux, who has
shown that stasis is justice. Two statements by Aristotle, however, com-
plement Loraux’s insight. These rarely noticed statements affront the
usual interpretation of an Aristotelian politics that purportedly priv-
ileges concord and friendship as a preamble to the Christian politics
of universalized love. Aristotle’s conjunction of stasis, friendship, and
justice allows for a theory of judgment as the condition of the possi-
bility of the political.
The Wrst statement comes from the beginning of Book VIII of the
Nicomachean Ethics. In introducing friendship (philia), Aristotle juxta-
poses it to justice and stasis. In H. Rackham’s translation in the Loeb
edition the meaning seems straightforward: while friendship and con-
cord are the highest ideals of the polis, stasis is the “self-laceration”
that must be cured.39 This is the usual understanding of stasis.
Such a reading, however, is not as self-evident when the Greek
text itself is examined. To start with, the mood of the verbs is optative,
expressing a wish, one could say a wish-fulWllment or a fantasy, rather
than a reality. Further, the crucial participle construction, “if men are 
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friends, . . . ” is not self-evidently conditional. It could equally well be
causative. This would change the translation:
Moreover, friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers
seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote con-
cord, which seems akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while stasis,
which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish. Because people
are friends they must have no justice, given that they lack justice [i.e., by
virtue of being friends]. Conversely, the just people need friendship more
than anything.40
This is an extraordinary statement. It invites the use of the privative
whenever friendship and justice are juxtaposed.41 Friends are unjust,
while the just are unfriendly. This is not a simple negation or exclu-
sion. Aristotle indicates a rupture or interruption between friendship
and justice. The nature of this rupture is not the same for those who
are just and those who are friends. Even though both friendship and
justice can be thought without recourse to the other, still the friends
can do without justice while the just cannot do without friendship.
Aristotle was perfectly aware of the wishful nature of such an asser-
tion, hence the use of the optative mood. Such a notion of the friend
is nothing but an ideal, the fantasy of the “lawgivers” about the per-
fect citizen.42
There is a constellation of four terms: friendship, justice, stasis,
and the political. The following statement from Politics delineates the
conWguration of this constellation:
The citizens who stand out because of their virtue would, with the utmost
justice, cause a stasis or rebellion. Nevertheless, they are practically the
least inclined to do so. The reason [they would cause, with the utmost jus-
tice, a stasis] is that according to the proper use of logos, only they suffer
inequality universally.43
The relation between justice and stasis is impossible. On the one hand,
the bearers of justice should be revolutionaries, since their virtue makes
them stand out from the majority, who nevertheless control the polis.
Their justness makes them unfriendly. On the other hand, however,
they are the least likely to practically lead a revolution. Given that 
one of the highest political virtues is friendship, then this means that
their friendliness makes them unjust. Caught in this double bind, the
just rebels must but cannot be rebels in praxis. The Nicomachean Ethics
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described a rupture between friendship and justice from the perspec-
tive of politics. Politics describes a chiasmus between friendship and
justice. This chiasmus traverses the terrain of stasis. Friendship and
justice interrupt each other about stasis. The unfolding of this inter-
ruption, however, continues at the very moment it is suspended. This
is, then, also an interruption of stasis. The limits of friendship and
justice share a common ground, and that ground is, precisely, stasis.
The relation between justice and stasis is impossible. Yet the fact
that the two remain chiastically related announces an arrangement
pregnant with potential. The interruption of the relation between the
universality of justice and the practicality of leading a revolution is
identical with the virtuous man’s decision to renounce, in practical
terms, that which is, theoretically, just. This decision opens up a space
outside any straightforward separation of law and justice. The possi-
bility of justice highlights the political virtue of the just man. And yet
the laws of the state are not to be contravened even in most of the
cases when it would have been just to do so. It is this halting of action,
this putting the breaks on a decision, that conWgures the role of stasis
as central to the political. Stasis allows for the enactment of the im-
possible act of the political, namely the act of violence against a fel-
low citizen. The special feature of stasis is that it is no longer actualized
as an act of physical violence, it is not a war. It is, rather, the violent
act against physical violence and hence an inauguration of a space of
being-with. The state of being-with is a more profound instance of
friendship than the ideal friendship of the lawgivers. The friendship
of the lawgivers presupposes a community while a friendship linked
to stasis inaugurates a community. The danger of stasis creates a pro-
ductive friendship as being-with.
The opening up of the being-with of friendship is predicated upon
a double limit. The Wrst limit has already been encountered as the rup-
ture in the relation between friendship and justice. The impossibility
of stasis resulting in the just person’s decision to abstain from raising
a revolution entails that the separation between friendship and jus-
tice is not absolute. Instead, the two are set in a dynamic relation. Their
respective limits overlap. Thus friendship and justice enter in an inex-
haustible relation. There is, however, a second sense of the limit here.
It has to do with the just man’s restraint, or self-limitation, despite the
inequality he faces. The just man’s decision to refrain from action is
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an act of judgment. This political act, which is linked to the creation
of the community, is fundamentally different from the sovereign deci-
sion demanded in Schmitt’s theory of the sovereign. Nascent within
Aristotle’s thought about stasis is a theory of political judgment not
conWned to those who have kyriarchia (sovereignty or power); rather,
it belongs to those who can restrain power, even abstain from it. The
just person can potentially interrupt power in an act of judgment.
It would be, however, wrong to view the decision of the just per-
son as the act of a subject. Judgment here is not subjective. The just
man is compelled by the logic of the relation between justice and
friendship, which unfolds as it traverses the site of stasis. There is noth-
ing idiosyncratic or personal about such an exigency. In addition, it
would be equally wrong to view this judgment as objective. Aristotle
makes no mention of an environment or external circumstance com-
pelling a subject. Moreover, to the extent that this judgment creates a
being-with, then this judgment moves outside an opposition between
subject and object.
At this point, a conception of the theologico-political has already
been arrived at. The theologico-political is the creative power of the
being-with. This force allows for the confrontation between friendship
and justice. Friendship is the force that binds people together. Its reach
extends to the particular, but there is always an ineliminable excess.
This excess both distinguishes friendship from, and puts it in relation
with, justice. Justice breaks the hold of the law. It allows for a perspec-
tive beyond the mere here and now. At the same time, its confrontation
with friendship curtails its power to act. This complex relation be-
tween friendship and justice has been shown to be an interruption
about and on stasis. This interruption leads to a theory of political
judgment that neither privileges enmity nor presupposes a subjectivity
opposed to objectivity. From the perspective of the theologico-political,
stasis is that interruption. The privative in the relation between friend-
ship and justice, the friend is unjust and the just is unfriendly, is the
element of disease in their relation. Unlike Schmitt’s conception, dis-
ease is not identiWed as the stasis that has to be excluded from the
political. Rather, stasis is the regulative principle that sets in motion,
while it also halts, the relation between friendship and justice. Stasis
represents the point where friendship and justice, the theological 
and the political, intersect. It is an unstable point because the relation
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between friendship and justice is unstable, never determined in ad-
vance. But this also means that stasis is a site of possibility and creation,
the creation of the being-with. Stasis, as this creative power, is the lim-
itless limit of the theologico-political.
WORKING WITH STASIS
It was argued at the beginning that stasis has the potential to avoid abso-
lute negation, and hence to lead to a politics that is non-teleological.
The philological approach to stasis showed that reading practice, the
interpretation of negation, is intricately linked to the possibility of
judgment and hence to the possibility of the political. Carl Schmitt
reduced judgment to the power of the sovereign’s decision upon the
exception, which required an absolute exclusion or negation of stasis
from the political. But Schmitt’s own political category of immanent
action required that which it had excluded, namely transcendence.
Aristotle’s interplay between friendship and justice in relation to sta-
sis allowed for interruption instead of negation. None of the terms is
absolute and none completely excludes the other, they are consup-
ponible in the chiasmus. This interplay, it was suggested, opens the
way for the theologico-political, that is, for a notion of judgment that
allows for commonality without recourse to absolute negation. But
does this mean that the theologico-political is beyond political theol-
ogy? More emphatically, is there a beyond political theology?
The question about the “beyond” is a question about time. What is
the temporality of stasis when it is related to the theologico-political?
What is the temporality of stasis when its third category of meaning,
interpretation and disease, functions as the regulative principle of
the two main clusters of signiWcation, mobility and immobility? An
answer to this question has three aspects.
First, the temporality of stasis in relation to the theologico-political
is intimately linked to the impossibility of Wxing stasis to a particular
locus. As already intimated, stasis is the interruption of friendship
and justice and as such it is a creative process. Stasis continuously
creates being-with. Commonality is produced by stasis. This alludes
to the future. Stasis, in its creative aspect, partakes of the future. Cre-
ation is ongoing. The question whether and when this process might
DIMITRIS VARDOULAKIS142
04 Vardoulakis.qxd  10/8/2009  9:00 AM  Page 142
stop, in other words, whether there is from this perspective a beyond 
political theology or an end of history, is not one that can be answered
without a (prophetic) knowledge of the future. At this point, the sec-
ond aspect becomes crucial. Stasis indicates a process that is also
always singular and hence a process that is localized. The theologico-
political is the confrontation between religion and politics, but it is a
confrontation which is not produced ex nihilo. It requires work. The
relation between the two main terms—understood either as the the-
ological and the political, or as immobility and mobility, or as friend-
ship and justice—is interrupted through the effort of interpretation.
And this effort includes the work of identifying those elements in the
discourse designated as infectious or diseased in order to be expunged.
In other words, even if stasis unworks meaningfulness, still it requires
an effort or work. It is this work that allows for a different sense of
meaning to be reinscribed in stasis, a meaning that is unstable because
it is yet to come. Third, labor or work is indispensable. Stasis cannot
lead to the theologico-political without work. This is an afWrmation
of the primacy of materiality, of actuality. But this notion of the mate-
rial and the actual should not be confused with a notion of particu-
larity such as it can be counterpoised to universality. Rather, actuality
here is to be understood as the labor of stasis that allows it to be the
regulative principle of the relation between mobility and immobility.
This incessant interplay is the condition of the possibility of the polit-
ical. To recall the imagery from Alcaeus’ poem, it is the labor of the
boat brought to a standstill between counter-directional winds. The
fact that the winds have stopped the boat does not mean that the crew
can rest. The waves are coming from both sides and, if anything, even
more effort is required at this place of restless repose.
In the question—is there a beyond political theology?—the empha-
sis, then, should not be placed on the “beyond.” Rather, the emphasis
should be placed on the possibility contained within the question mark.
How is such a beyond possible? By insisting on the question that the
theologico-political itself makes possible, it is the effort to answer this
question that is put into work. There are interruptions of the work of
this questioning, there are political judgments. And yet no single judg-
ment can make a Wnal decision but can only lead to further work, to
yet another question mark.
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